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‘A Travelling Eye of God’ 
 
Lying in a hospital bed recovering from his physical and mental 
injuries, an unnamed World War One soldier, in Mary Butts’s short 
story ‘Speed the Plough’, recalls France: ‘and saw in the sky great 
aeroplanes dipping and swerving, or holding on their steady flight 
like a travelling eye of God’ (Butts, 1991: 10). The inhumanity of 
this aerial view is expressed in Rex Warner’s 1941 novel The 
Aerodrome: 
 
In the air there is no feeling or smell of earth, and I 
have often observed that the backyards of houses 
or the smoke curling up through cottage 
chimneys, although at times they seem to have a 
certain pathos, do as a rule, when one is several 
thousand feet above them, appear both 
defenceless and ridiculous, as though infinite 
trouble had been taken to secure a result that has 
little or no significance. (1982: 224) 
 
From the view of the ‘travelling eye of God’ what lies below is 
rendered as ‘defenceless and ridiculous’, vulnerable to this eye as the 
operator of violence. These responses to aerial warfare already 
encode a discourse of the theological view and its concomitant 
inhumanity that can not only be traced through the literary moment 
of modernism (Mellor, 2011; Lindqvist, 2001; Saint-Amour, 2011; 
Beer, 1990), but which also echoes uncannily with the discourse 
surrounding drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Nixon, 
2014). 
 
This line of reflection is evident in Jasper Bernes’s and Joshua 
Clover’s recent ‘ballad’ in their joint poetry collection 
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Götterdämmerung Family BBQ (2013). Here we find a parody of 
Wordsworth connected to our ‘drone present’: 
 
I wandered lonely as a drone 
That floats o’er jails and landfill 
And monitors what we say on the phone.  
(2013: 18) 
 
In this reworking the focused ‘lamp’ of Romanticism, the ‘inward 
eye’ (Abrams, 1971), is transformed into the electronic ‘outward 
eye’ of the drone. What is monitored is not the internal imagination, 
but our external phone conversations, in which the surveillance state 
tries to capture our potential dissidence. Wordsworthian pastoral, 
itself not as unpolitical as it is often taken, is turned towards the junk 
spaces of our crisis present. The drone finds its destination as the 
signature device of the forms of contemporary power, our mobile 
panopticon. 
 
Paul Virilio, describing the aim of military ‘sight machines’, suggests: 
‘In a technicians’ version of an all-seeing Divinity, ever ruling out 
accident and surprise, the drive is on for a general system of 
illumination that will allow everything to be seen and known, at 
every moment and in every place’ (1989: 4). The Predators and 
Reapers that return the war home incarnate this global and godly 
vision; explicitly reflecting on drones, Virilio later comments: ‘the 
eye of God is everywhere’ (1999: 102; Chamayou, 2015: 37). The 
analysis of drones has explicated this mode of vision as the ‘drone 
stare’ (Wall & Monahan, 2011), ‘drone vision’ (Stahl, 2013), or the 
‘scopic regime’ of drones (Gregory, 2011). Its theological resonance 
is even noted by drone operators themselves, with one reported as 
saying: ‘Sometimes I feel like a God hurling thunderbolts from afar’ 
(qtd. in Policante, 2012: 113). Drones inhabit a field of theological 
metaphysics, embodying dreams of transcendence and destruction 
that have haunted the Western imagination. It is this metaphysics 
that I wish to probe. 
 
 
The Drone Present 
 
The analysis of drone discourse has consistently registered the 
theological and metaphysical ‘supplement’ that surrounds the drone. 
I will argue – in line with Derrida’s analysis of the constitutive 
equivocation of the notion of supplement, which is both 
unnecessary extra addition and necessary element of completion 
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(Derrida, 1974: 144–45) – that this ‘supplement’ is not simply a 
mistaken appendage that could be removed to ‘really’ see the drone, 
but part of what we must critically analyse to grasp the drone. The 
risk of engaging with this theological or metaphysical resonance 
seriously is that we feed the technological fetishism that can impinge 
on the thinking of drones. To treat drones as if they were the 
‘travelling eye of God’ is to flatter this mundane and brutal 
surveillance and killing device. We may give a technological object, 
or technological assemblage, a philosophical dignity it does not 
deserve. 
 
This is the danger of techno-fetishism (Shaw, 2011), which is not 
quite what Marx meant by fetishism, in his account of the fetishism 
of the commodity (1990: 163–177), or what Freud meant by 
fetishism, as a diagnostic category of sexual perversion (1977: 345–
357), but something which mixes both. It involves the mysticism of 
material object being treated as possessed of divine powers, and the 
sexualisation of that power as a peculiar displaced potency. The 
result is the inflation of the technological object to something that 
horrifies and fascinates, electing it out of history into a natural or 
metaphysical realm.1 This risk may be particularly acute when one 
approaches the drone as a philosopher or theorist. The absence of 
technical, sociological or other expert analysis can lead to the 
reification of the drone into a metaphysical dignity it does not 
warrant. It is, however, possible to interrogate the metaphysical 
stakes at work in this techno-fetishism, which cuts across both drone 
advocates and drone critics, without succumbing to it. It is only by 
taking seriously this fetishism that we can sharpen our critical 
discourse, the better to resist the seductions of drones. 
 
To refer to ‘drone metaphysics’ is to refer to the particular 
theological and metaphysical discourses that become attached to, or 
embodied in, the practices and discourses that circulate around 
drones. Ian Shaw has argued that the drone constitutes a 
‘metaphysical object’ in terms of its ability to construct and legislate 
a ‘world’ through the shaping effects of audiovisual and destructive 
technological capacities (2011: 127–33). This has been reinforced 
by critics who have traced the drone as ‘emergent object’ (Walters, 
2014), and considered the ontological effects of the drone on our 
conception of the human (Holmqvist, 2013). These arguments 
suggest the drone constitutively exceeds its ‘function’ as mere 
surveillance and killing machine, engaging with metaphysical 
questions of sight, power, and the forms of the human. 
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It is Grégoire Chamayou who has pursued this line of thought with 
most rigour, developing his argument that the drone embodies 
‘cynegetic war’ (2011: 4): war that is based on the treatment of 
humans as prey, subject to the manhunt (Chamayou, 2012; 2015). 
He points out: 
 
‘Predator’, ‘Global Hawk’, ‘Reaper’ – birds of prey 
and angels of death, drones bear their names well. 
Only death can kill without ever dying itself. 
Facing such an enemy, there is no way out. As a T-
shirt glorifying American drones stated: ‘You can 
run, but you’ll only die tired.’ (2011: 4) 
 
‘Angels of death’, ‘exterminating angel[s]’ (Wills, 2014: 181), 
legislators of the world, drones, in these critical analyses, take on a 
theological and metaphysical function – the God’s eye view and 
action that I have already suggested. 
 
This metaphysics, I will argue, tends, in Jamie Allinson’s words, to 
treat drones as ‘object[s] of potent thing-ness’ and not as ‘fusions of 
human flesh, cybernetic weapon[s] and imperial and military 
apparatus[es]’ (2015). It ascribes agency and activity that flatters 
the drone as object and elides the intricate meshing with human 
labour that makes drone operation possible. The ‘god-like’ capacity 
of drones – for both vision and killing – incites an attribution to 
them of theological and metaphysical powers. To trace the 
theological metaphysics of drones I will examine a number of 
discourses, mainly drawn from philosophy, literature, art, and 
theory. These discourses will be largely pre-drone, as some of my 
interest is in their predictive capacity and what we might call the 
desire for the drone at work, at and in these moments, even as they 
resist the tendency that would lead to the emergence of drones. 
Also, these discourses will, like mine, be somewhat equivocal. My 
claim is not simply that we can expel this metaphysics to reach a true 
and accurate discourse, that we can simply conjure away the myths 
and metaphysics to bare the real, but that our experience of the 
‘reality’ of drones involves these myths and metaphysics, which 
return to haunt us (Rothstein, 2015). In fact, as we shall see, it is the 
transformative promise of drone metaphysics that is crucial: to 
‘become-drone’ may be, strictly speaking, impossible, but this does 
not prevent, and rather incites, a metaphysical desire for 
transcendence. 
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The Drone as World-Spirit 
 
In one of his mordant postwar reflections, collected in Minima 
Moralia (1951), Theodor Adorno remarks on the effects of the new 
technologies of death on our conception of history: 
 
Had Hegel’s philosophy of history embraced this 
age, Hitler’s robot-bombs would have found their 
place beside the early death of Alexander and 
similar images, as one of the selected empirical 
facts by which the state of the world-spirit 
manifests itself directly in symbols. Like Fascism 
itself, the robots career without a subject. Like it 
they combine utmost technical perfection with 
total blindness. And like it they arouse mortal 
terror and are wholly futile. – ‘I have seen the 
world-spirit,’ not on horseback, but on wings and 
without a head, and that refutes, at the same 
stroke, Hegel’s philosophy of history. (1978: 55; 
see Chamayou, 2015: 205) 
 
For Adorno the incarnation of the world-spirit in the subject-less 
weapons – the V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets – refutes Hegel’s 
philosophy of history, in which the world-spirit is incarnated in 
world-historical individuals. We enter a new era of modernity, in 
which ‘[t]he subject still feels sure of its autonomy, but the nullity 
demonstrated by the concentration camps is already overtaking the 
form of subjectivity itself’ (Adorno, 1978: 16). This nullity is figured 
in the vehicle without a pilot, in the fully automated weapon, 
careering out of our control. 
 
Hegel, of course, was completely aware of the sanguinary nature of 
the historical process, even as it instantiated reason. In his Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, he remarked that history is an 
‘altar on which the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states, and the 
virtue of individuals are slaughtered’ (Hegel, 1975: 69; italics in 
original). The role and fate of world-historical individuals is no 
happier: 
 
Thus it was not happiness that they chose, but 
exertion, conflict, and labour in the service of their 
end. And even when they reached their goal, 
peaceful enjoyment and happiness were not their 
lot. Their actions are their entire being, and their 
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whole nature and character are determined by 
their ruling passion. When their end is attained, 
they fall aside like empty husks. They may have 
undergone great difficulties in order to 
accomplish their purpose, but as soon as they 
have done so, they die early like Alexander, are 
murdered like Caesar, or deported like Napoleon. 
(Hegel, 1975: 85) 
 
The irony of history is that the one who ‘makes’ history becomes a 
nullity, a mere husk of the process of reason. Yet this happens to a 
subject. Adorno is considering a situation in which reason cannot 
persist due to the extinction of the subject. Grégoire Chamayou, 
however, has pointed out that Adorno gives this situation a 
dialectical twist (2015: 206). Adorno remarks that in the situation of 
war in which the enemy is reduced to the status of ‘patient and 
corpse’, we find ‘Satanically, indeed, more initiative is in a sense 
demanded here than in old-style war: it seems to cost the subject his 
whole energy to achieve subjectlessness’ (1978: 56). Chamayou 
glosses that this ‘extinction’ of subjectivity is not automatic but 
‘becomes the main task of subjectivity’ (2015: 207). The dream of 
the contemporary world-spirit is to shuck off the ‘empty husk’ of the 
world-historical individual and to achieve impossible embodiment 
in the drone itself. 
 
Elizabeth Bowen’s 1948 novel The Heat of the Day includes a 
reflection on a V-1 attack that uncannily echoes the experience of 
drones, down to the auditory effect: ‘droning things, mindlessly 
making for you, thick and fast, day and night, tore the calico of 
London, raising obscene dust out of the sullen bottom mind’ (1998: 
328; italics in original). In July 1944 Bowen’s house had been ‘blown 
hollow inside by a V-1’ (Lee, 1999: 149). Those who live under 
drones report a state of uncertainty and terror, in which the sound of 
drones presages the perpetual possibility of death (Chamayou, 
2015: 44–5). Of course, unlike the V-1 or V-2, the drone is steered 
by a pilot, currently. The dream, or nightmare, of the pilotless drone, 
fully automated, and with the capacity to kill through its own 
execution of algorithms, is one that still lies on the horizon of the 
present moment (Chamayou, 2015: 207–13). 
 
Current speculation has considered that if we enter a world of 
automated drones it might still be possible to make the algorithms 
which they would use to select and kill targets legally responsible for 
‘collateral’ or incorrect killings (Schuppli, 2014). It is true, however, 
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that even now the integration of the human and non-human actors 
in the ‘kill-chain’ generates difficulties in sorting and assessing moral 
and legal responsibility (Schuppli, 2014: 4). In response, the 
discussion of drones has often focused on the role of their pilots, 
their experience of killing-at-a-distance, and their responsibility 
(Benjamin, 2013: 83-100; Holmqvist, 2013). The anxiety that 
surrounds the possibility of the fully-automated drone, the true 
realisation of Adorno’s fear of subject-less weapons, is a sign of our 
assumption that we need to retain the human element to subject the 
drone to reasoned critique (Adams & Barrie, 2013; Benjamin, 2013: 
199). This is why Derek Gregory has stressed that the fabled 
‘compression of the kill-chain’ – the minimisation of the role of 
humans in drone operation – is not that compressed. Gregory states: 
 
The kill-chain can be thought of as a dispersed 
and distributed apparatus, a congeries of actors, 
objects, practices, discourses and affects, that 
entrains the people who are made part of it and 
constitutes them as particular kinds of subjects. 
(2011: 196) 
 
The human enters the kill chain, only to be enchained as a particular 
kind of subject. So, while the persistence of humans in the kill-chain 
offers points of political intervention we can also note the 
implication of Gregory’s claim: these humans are constituted in 
ways to make them resist calls on their humanity and they are called 
to conform to the drone (Holmqvist, 2013). Adorno’s prescient 
insight confirms that the achievement of ‘subjectlessness’ is not 
simply the effect of automation, but a labour by the subject that 
operates on itself in the process of self-automation, or the creation of 
an ‘automatic self’. 
 
In Javier Marías’s The Infatuations (2013), the central character and 
focal consciousness of the novel, María Dolz, ponders a series of 
unpunished crimes, which include ‘the bombing of civilians by our 
aircraft with no pilot and therefore no face’ (2013: 231). The issue 
of the ‘face’ condenses this problem with the role of the human in 
drone metaphysics. The desire to put a ‘face’ to the drone perhaps 
accounts for the tendency of discussion to focus on the lives of the 
pilots, a tendency which comes at the risk of occluding the lives of 
the victims (Stahl, 2013: 670–71; Gregory, 2011: 204). The ‘face’ is 
displaced by the fact that the victims do not see the face of their 
killers, while their killers do experience an intense intimacy with 
them, although this ‘intimacy’ is an invasive and destructive one 
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(Gregory, 2011: 201). This is a violently asymmetrical intimacy, in 
which ‘the operator will never see his victim seeing him doing what he 
does to him’ (Chamayou, 2015: 118; italics in original). We are also 
displaced from the faces of the victims, who are rendered into enemy 
forces, as in the infamous incident on 21 February 2010, in Oruzgan 
province in central Afghanistan, when at least 23 civilians were killed 
by Kiowa attack helicopters directed to the target by drone pilots 
(Gregory, 2011: 201–3). The drone operators transformed women 
and children into weapons-carrying ‘military-aged males’, into those 
who could be killed at the expense of seeing their actual faces 
(Scahill, 2014: 352). 
 
The photographer Noor Behram has devoted his efforts to taking 
photographs of the victims of drone strikes, at obvious personal risk, 
not least due to the American military’s tendency to ‘double-tap’ 
strikes, when a target is hit multiple times in quick succession 
(Delmont, 2013: 197). His work attempts ‘an aesthetic and 
operational reversal of the target’s visual logic’ (Adey et al, 2011: 
183), which places us in the ‘view from below’ (Hewitt, 1983). 
Certainly restoring a face to the victims is crucial, trying to shift 
identification from the drone to the damage it does. It is also crucial, 
despite the risk of shifting focus from the victims, to insist on the 
‘face’, in the sense of moral responsibility, of those in the kill chain. 
The difficulty is – if we take Gregory’s point about the constitution 
of the subject in the kill chain alongside Adorno’s provocation – that 
the ontology of the human may be rendered in a face-less fashion 
that constantly tries to rework and occlude this insistence on the 
‘face’. While humanisation can lead to over-sympathetic 
identification with drone pilots and leads drone pilots to over-
identify with ‘their’ troops on the ground, we can add that drone 
metaphysics is an operation of constitution and transformation of 
subjects into a ‘face-less’ state. This state cannot be reached, or is not 
yet within our technological capacities, but this does not prevent the 
repeated striving for this state. Putting a ‘face’ to the drone is a 
necessary critical gesture, but considering the transformative power 
of drone metaphysics, not a sufficient critical gesture, as we will see. 
 
 
Military Gnosticism 
 
In some enigmatic passages of Speed and Politics (1978) Paul Virilio 
turns to the metaphysics of metempsychosis – the transmigration of 
souls – to suggest the tension of the loading of the soul on to various 
‘metabolic vehicles’ (1986: 89). Virilio argues that the soul is ‘plural, 
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multiform, fluidiform, coagulated here and there in social, animal or 
territorial bodies’ (1986: 75). The military adopt and literalise this 
metaphysics. If ‘[a]ncient metempsychosis imagined a plethora of 
intelligences in search of undifferentiated matter’, then the military 
turns this free transmigration of souls into an act of conquest 
(Virilio, 1986: 89). They force bodies into motion, impose 
deterritorialisation, and reduce the masses to the ‘animal’ status of 
soulless bodies ripe for occupation (76). The ‘free-floating’ will of 
the military gains power by its dromocratic violence that imposes 
both sedentariness and movement on human, animal, and technical 
‘bodies’. This is also true of the assembling of the body from a 
‘metabolic vehicle’ to a ‘technical vehicle’, what Virilio calls ‘the 
bestiary of engines’ (88), of which the drone is one contemporary 
instance. 
 
Turning from philosophy to religion Virilio also likens this ‘powerful 
soul’ to the ‘gyrovagues’, wandering and itinerant monks often 
condemned by the church of the early Middle Ages for their 
parasitic mobility, selling of fake relics, and gluttony (1986: 90). 
According to St Benedict, in his Rules: 
 
The fourth kind of monks are those called 
‘Girovagi’, who spend all their lives-long 
wandering about divers provinces, staying in 
different cells for three or four days at a time, ever 
roaming, with no stability, given up to their own 
pleasures and to the snares of gluttony, and worse 
in all things than the Sarabites [monks who have 
no rule outside themselves]. Of the most 
wretched life of these it is better to say nothing 
than to speak. Leaving them alone therefore, let us 
set to work, by the help of God, to lay down a rule 
for the Cenobites [those who live in monasteries, 
under the direction on an Abbot], that is, the 
strongest kind of monks. (in Anon, 2013) 
 
While the wandering monks threaten the social order, military 
Monasticism channels this wandering into the discipline of a mobile 
war-machine (Virilio, 1986: 90). The military takes over this mobile 
function, reproducing the vagabond wandering and parasitism of the 
Gyrovagues. 
 
These assessments follow Virilio’s heterodox Catholicism in reviving 
past ‘heresies’ as mechanisms of critique. This is revealing of longer 
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patterns of metaphysical presumption, even if we may not be 
inclined to accept Virilio’s own theological orientation. We can 
summarise these twin criticisms under a category of heresy Virilio 
does not, at these points, explicitly use: Gnosticism. The flight from 
body to body, the wandering of itinerant monks, which figure the 
‘trans-national’ military caste, can be seen as forms of the Gnostic 
hatred of matter. This ‘military Gnosticism’ assumes the ‘powerful’ 
soul is deterritorialised, fluid and transferable, while the ‘weak soul’ 
is imprisoned within the body and the world (Virilio, 1986: 75–76). 
The military move from vehicle to vehicle, while the proletarian 
subjects of this caste or class are left only with their own bodies. The 
military operates through this constant movement across territories 
without ever settling into place, becoming ‘wills that occupy the 
invisible or uninhabitable parts of the universe’ (Virilio, 1986: 92). 
 
In this military Gnosticism acceleration is not only the acceleration 
of the vehicle but the ‘pure’ acceleration of the soul moving 
smoothly from embodiment to embodiment, and so able to exceed 
any territorial capture. At the same time this accelerative 
displacement also comes to displace the military as well: 
 
Look at the war on the Falkland Islands. It’s very 
revelatory. Take the captain of the ‘Sheffield’ and 
the pilot of the ’Super Etendard’ The pilot 
answers to the slogan of the Exocet missiles: ’Fire 
and forget’. Push the button and get out of there. 
You go home, you’ve seen nothing. You fired 
forty, sixty kilometres away from your target. You 
don’t care, the missile does it all. On the other 
side there’s the ’Sheffield’ captain who says; ’In 
this war, everything happens in a few seconds, we 
have no time to react.’ You see two military men 
in uniform; one an Argentine pilot, the other a 
veteran of the Home Fleet, who say: ’The missiles 
go by themselves. We are finished ….’ (Virilio, 
1983: 18) 
 
If the military extinguish the ecological possibilities of resistance, 
which require the ability to secure a body and secure a place, they 
also extinguish, Virilio claims, their own role. 
 
The ‘assumption of cybernetics into the heavens’ (Virilio, 1989: 2) 
is the most radical expression of this military Gnosticism. The 
extremity of this deterritorialisation involves the idolatry of 
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assuming the position of God: ‘Today, we have achieved the three 
attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity, immediacy; 
omnivoyance and omnipotence’ (Virilio, 1989: 17). The military 
caste incarnates the nihilistic politics of ‘pure war’ in which global 
space becomes a playground for these detached souls. The drone, of 
course, appears as the apotheosis of this project: 
 
Drones are a combination of the new and the old: 
a new aerial surveillance and killing system with 
capabilities previously not offered by 
conventional air power, coupled with an older 
cosmic view of air mastery through technological 
speed, verticality, and vision. (Wall & Monahan, 
2011: 241) 
 
The drone combines the archaic and the new, realising, if we follow 
Virilio, the implicit Gnostic escape from the constraints of matter. 
 
Of course matters are not so simple. Virilio’s method of 
extrapolating tendencies or exploring extremes can flatter the drone 
– which is an object that is hardly free of materiality or humanity. 
That said, what Virilio indicates is that military Gnosticism does not 
ignore this materiality or humanity, it constantly works on it. The 
fantasy of ‘pure war’ is a fantasy, but works through continually 
overcoming its various failures. Virilio’s own solution to this idolatry 
is to argue that unless we accept the god of transcendence we are 
forced to worship the ‘god-machine’ (1989: 83). This is a 
symmetrical gesture, which tries to escape the drone through a 
reference to a higher power. There is no doubt that religious beliefs 
have played a key role in peace movements, and especially in those 
concerned with the technological acceleration or assumption of 
‘God-like’ powers: from Bishop George Bell’s critique of mass aerial 
bombing of Germany by Britain in World War Two, to the post-war 
anti-nuclear movement. The difficulty is that it, too, occludes the 
transformatory work drone discourse performs to create the 
metaphysics of mobility and vision by which it operates. We need to 
consider this work as the site of our critique. 
 
 
Projectile Philosophy 
 
Drone metaphysics does not only direct us toward the drone, but 
also back to metaphysics. Paul Virilio notes that: ‘Unlike the ancient 
believer in metempsychosis, the metaphysician, intelligence in 
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transit, is welcome nowhere, is nowhere in his element. He is a 
projectile in the heart of the great All of conscious matter’ (1990: 
109). Exceeding the movement of the soul from body to body, 
metaphysics aims at a disincarnated intelligence that would inhabit 
the status of pure projectile. In Michael Dillon’s formulation, this is 
‘the desire of contemporary martial corporeality to become 
intelligence incarnate’ (2003: 129). The crucial justification for this 
‘projectile’ state is, according to Virilio, fragment 115 of the pre-
Socratic philosopher Empedocles. In this fragment the 
metaphysician is daimôn transformed from one form to another, 
without rest. Tossed between the elements, all of which reject him, 
he lives in ‘insensate strife’. This strife suggests that we are not just 
dealing with a militarisation of metaphysics, but a convergence 
between certain tendencies in metaphysics and the military. Virilio’s 
reference to the projectile as model obviously implies the drone as 
signature object, not just for discussion of contemporary power, but 
also for the thinking of metaphysics or philosophy. 
 
In Virilio’s analysis this ‘projectile’ state realises the abandonment of 
metabolic vehicles and the final dream of pure intelligence in transit. 
It aims at the replacement of the vital with the void of speed (Virilio, 
2005: 42). In this scenario we enter into our displacement by speed, 
trying to reach the metaphysical state of pure projectile through a 
willed abduction. This is not only a purely philosophical dream, but 
a political dream, or we could say a dream of philosopher as pure 
power. Virilio suggests: ‘This constant search for ideal 
weightlessness is at the heart of problems of domination’ (2005: 
43). In the case of the drone the displacement is not simply for 
speed as such, drones being fairly slow aerial vehicles: with speeds of 
84 mph for a Predator and 230 mph for a Reaper (Gregory, 2014: 
15). The projectile fantasy is here, however, due to the fact the 
human is not literally inserted as pilot, not ‘mounted’ on the drone, 
except through the control and vision interfaces. The drone is an 
experience of weightless dominance in its displacement and 
augmentation of the ‘metabolic vector’ for the ‘void’, not so much of 
speed, but of invulnerability. 
 
The drone is a metaphysical device in its ‘realisation’ of this 
tendency of metaphysics, but as the quotation marks indicate this is 
never a full ‘realisation’. As we have already indicated with the 
theological element of vision, what Donna Haraway calls ‘the god-
trick of seeing everything from nowhere’ (1991: 189), always fails.2 
The critic who simply points out this is a trick, or that the trick fails, 
will not come to terms with the fact failure is built in to the need to 
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repeat the trick. It is not enough to say this is a trick when this is 
already well known. Similarly, for what I am arguing here concerning 
the projectile: the drone or any other vehicle, pending very large 
technological advances, will not incarnate the ‘pure intelligence in 
transit’. Again, this suggests that any such god-trick is a ‘techno-
cultural accomplishment’ (Gregory, 2011: 193; italics in original), 
but an accomplishment that must be repeated and is never fully 
accomplished. 
 
Rex Warner’s novel The Aerodrome offers a powerful prefiguration of 
this situation. It concerns the conflict between the life of the village – 
symbolic of materiality, contingency and a very British ‘muddling 
through’ – and the air force, the incarnation of a fascist promise of 
transcendence and purity. The narrator Roy embodies this tension. 
Finding out his fiancée may, in fact, be his sister, he abandons this 
particularly acute sexual ‘mess’ for the life of the aerodrome. Roy 
remarks: ‘Though I knew the people here well, and loved them, I 
was disgusted and frightened by the contrast between their quick 
anger, their sudden levity, and the undeviating precision and 
resolution of the Air Vice-Marshal’ (Warner, 1982: 103). Subject to 
intensive training, Roy and his surviving fellow recruits are lectured 
by the Air Vice-Marshal, who proclaims his creed: ‘There remains 
the evolution, or rather the transformation, of consciousness and 
will, the escape from time, the mastery of the self’ (Warner, 1982: 
188). The appeal of the air force is, precisely, this evolution that 
transcends the messy contingencies of the village. This 
transcendence into purity includes the abolition of the human factor 
of its own pilots. The air force has developed new pilotless planes, 
which allow the delegation of warfare, so the air force can devote its 
energies to the transformation of the whole society in its image. 
Contemplating these pilotless planes, the narrator Roy accepts ‘the 
fact that metal and electricity and the directing brain so easily 
surpass the performances of our own eyes and nerves and muscles’ 
(Warner, 1982: 195). These ‘drones’ are welcomed as the final 
devices of pure aerial ability, leaving their redundant pilots to return 
to the duty of reworking society in the image of the new aerial order. 
 
Warner’s novel gradually unfolds the revenge of messy materiality 
on the air force. The Flight Lieutenant Roy admires for his amorous 
and military prowess is a mere desk-pilot. It is also revealed that Roy 
is the son of the air marshal, and so can only escape one incestuous 
scenario for another. It will be through a new love affair for Roy that 
the final victory of the village over the air force is achieved. This is a 
slightly unsatisfactory and unconvincing resolution. The deep 
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tension of the novel reveals itself in the promise of the air force to 
resolve such ‘mess’ into purity and transcendence, which implies 
that messy materiality is not a counter to transcendence, but its 
condition. While the air force might be sullied, the need to 
overcome this by the metaphysics of will and the projectile suggest 
the need for ‘mess’ as the site to be subject to constant 
transformation, as the very material on which it works. 
 
To return to the project dream of metaphysics we can note the same 
structure. ‘Intelligence in transit’ is never fully achieved, but the 
repetitions of metaphysics constantly aim at lifting us above 
materialities, while constantly working on them. Paul K. Saint-
Amour (2011: 262) has noted, in his discussion of aerial 
photomosaic, that the appeal to the contingency and fluidity of the 
horizontal to counter the ‘dominance’ of verticality is problematic. 
First, the horizontal is not some ‘pure’ zone freed from power, as his 
example of ‘horizontal’ geographic mapping indicates. Second, 
reading the vertical as a site of pure domination underestimates the 
complexity and tension in constituting the vertical as a site of power. 
My contention is similar in suggesting that messy materiality is not, 
itself, simply the solution to the transcendence of drone 
metaphysics. Rather, we have to grasp the labour that drone 
metaphysics performs as a constant work of transformation that 
aims at the vertical by means of the horizontal. 
 
 
Banality and demystification 
 
It is obvious that in reaction to discourses of mystification we resort 
to demystification. A hallmark of work on drones, as we have seen, 
has been the drive to deflate the claims of ‘god-like’ power that 
haunt drone discourse. This includes artistic work to make visible 
the human and material destruction drones inflict (Delmont, 2013), 
recognising that drones are not ‘human free’ but require more 
personnel than conventional aircraft (Benjamin, 2013: 21), and 
stressing their technical limitations, in terms of lack of range, speed, 
and vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire, which make them unlikely 
candidates for ‘the advancing edge of American Empire’ (Gregory, 
2014: 15). It is necessary, Gregory insists, to remember that an 
‘everywhere war’ is also a ‘somewhere war’ (2014: 15), and his 
conclusion is that we should not sever drones ‘from the matrix of 
military and paramilitary violence of which they are but a part’ 
(2014: 16). Amedeo Policante concludes that the drone brings an 
end to the Clausewitzean notion of warfare as heroic duel. In the end 
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the drone-operator’s lot is an indication that: ‘The tedious 
dreariness of the machine has now absorbed even the last fantasies 
of autonomy that needed the extreme speed of war to find its space’ 
(Policante, 2012: 114; Stahl, 2013: 671). This point is reinforced by 
Stephen Voyce (2014), who notes that the signature effect of the 
drone is due to the conjunction of banal labour and deadly violence: 
‘The Drone – a strange but all too appropriate synonym – abruptly 
yokes together the monotonous work of “office drones” with the 
“unmanned aerial vehicles” which they now operate in great 
numbers above Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and soon 
elsewhere.’ In all these cases a necessary work of deflation, 
demystification and banalisation is used to contest what I have 
called ‘drone metaphysics’. 
 
I have suggested, however, that an essential element of drone 
metaphysics is the constant promise it offers to rework and 
transform the messy materialities of the human and the technical. 
This reworking is a task that produces an effect of mystical or 
metaphysical power out of this very banality. Milena, writing about 
Kafka, noted: ‘He sees life very differently from other people. To 
him, for instance, money, the stock market, exchange bureaus, a 
typewriter are absolutely mystical things’ (in Buber-Neumann, 
1988: 64).3 The point is the ‘reduction’ of the drone to bureaucratic 
banality may not reduce their absolute mysticism. Rather, their 
metaphysics or mysticism is a result of this very banality and 
integration, which can then generate fantasies of ‘autonomous 
acceleration’. 
 
This is the tension that remains for the critic. The return to banality 
and the human factor offers capacities for intervention, yet we also 
need to track the transformation of these, within the ‘congeries of 
the kill-chain’, back into a particular kind of metaphysics and the 
desire for a particular kind of subject-less subject. While Caroline 
Holmqvist, for example, addresses the contact zone between ‘the 
steely bodies of drones’ and ‘the fleshy ones of human beings’ 
(2013: 538), her tendency is to focus on human ontology as a means 
to bring the drone into the ambit of critique (2013: 548). This is 
obviously crucial when the reliance on technology can serve to 
dissimulate human agency and moral responsibility (Adams & 
Barrie, 2013: 254). Yet I want suggest that we take more seriously 
this desire for the transformation of flesh into steel, or better the 
fusion of flesh with steel.4 The dreariness or banality of the machine, 
or the operation of the machine, is not the destruction of fantasies of 
autonomy or acceleration, but also their condition. The dream of 
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‘accelerationism’ (Noys, 2014) depends on the capacity to 
constantly return and rework failures of acceleration through yet 
another effort to be finally accelerationist. 
 
In the case of critique I do not think this means abandoning any of 
the resources of metaphysics or philosophy for some empirical, 
local, or politicised discourse that we might assume could simply 
immunise us against this metaphysics. While I have constantly 
drawn on these discourses, which are crucial, we also need to grasp 
the metaphysical ‘aura’ that results from the labour on messy 
materiality and the embeddedness of drones. This is why, as we saw 
with Rex Warner’s novel, a faith in messy materiality to resist the 
dream of transcendence is misplaced. Equally, I am suggesting the 
attempt to outbid transcendence through a religious faith in 
absolute transcendence, as Virilio suggests, is also problematic. 
What these gestures risk is replicating a drone metaphysics that 
operates by the constant oscillation between these two points. 
Switching from messy materiality to transcendence, usually through 
the mode of acceleration, is what drone metaphysics thrives on to 
occlude the tensions, frictions, and forms of violence at work in this 
switching and transformation. 
 
Certainly, attention to the material and to the elements of labour-
power that undergird these fantasies of transformation and 
acceleration is essential. Such attention requires awareness, 
however, that these ‘material’ elements are not simply counters to 
the abstractive power of drone vision. Marx’s analysis of the 
commodity-form, which attends to the banality of equivalence, also 
insists that such a work of social abstraction generates ‘metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties’ (1990: 163). We are not 
opposing the concrete and material to the abstraction, but trying to 
probe a work of abstraction that cuts across this distinction. The 
accelerative discourse of transcendence tries to escape the problem 
by posing a final transcendence that can recode the material in a 
‘saved’ form. The return to messy materiality, similarly tries to save 
the material as a point of resistance: hence the symmetry in which 
theological or religious discourses are, at the same time, 
transcendent and concerned with materiality. 
 
The refinement of critical analysis I am suggesting, which is already 
touched upon by many drone critics, is to dwell more with the 
disruption of the discourse of drone metaphysics in this space of 
transformation it creates. It is effects of negation, interruption, and 
refusal in this process of transformation that, I propose, are crucial. 
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This is to challenge certain discourses of ‘acceleration’ that regard 
resistance as lying in a capacity of excess, the friction-less, 
hypertrophy, and so forth that are claimed to outpace the forms of 
military, state, and capitalist power. The desire for a final 
deterritorialisation that can slip into a smooth space of resistance is 
not only unfaithful to Deleuze and Guattari’s warning, ‘[n]ever 
believe a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (1988: 500), but also 
remains within the field of drone metaphysics.  
 
This ‘friction’ lies not solely in the human as resistant factor, but also 
in the human-technical interaction in the ‘congeries of the kill-
chain’. In particular, as I have suggested, this friction lies in the 
transformative work of integration that tries to constitute a 
‘subjectless’ process in which the human and technical coordinate in 
the smooth execution of the kill-chain. On its own this friction is not 
sufficient, as this returns us to the ‘mess’ that requires smoothing 
and integration. If a ‘smooth space’ does not suffice to save us, 
neither will a ‘rough space’. The antinomy itself is part of the 
problem I have identified in grasping the transformative, and non-
transformative, effect of drones. Instead, these points need to be 
activated into a work of negation that disrupts these processes of 
smoothing. Here I have focused on the identification of these points 
and these processes through an analysis of the literary, artistic, 
philosophical, and theological elements of drone discourse. This 
initial mapping requires a sense of continuity – the duration of the 
dream of the drone, the various drones, both real and virtual, that 
pre-existed our current situation; and an awareness of discontinuity 
– in terms of perceiving the transformation the drone has made, its 
retroactive effect in reinscribing those previous discourses. In this 
way we can trace and displace the hold that drone metaphysics has 
on us. 
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Notes 
 
1. An example of this fetishism can be found in Mike Davis’s (2008) 
discussion of the car bomb, where in an otherwise astute analysis he 
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often deploys naturalising metaphors for the spread of this ‘weapon 
of the weak’: ‘implacable virus’ (6), ‘Darwinian process’ (130), and 
‘a kudzu vine of destruction’ (188). 
 
2. I would, perhaps provocatively, add that the ‘god trick’ fails also 
for God, or any deity. This would be one way to read Derrida’s 
(1995) reflections on ‘total alterity’ as both the inscription of god 
and the ruination of the usual schema of godly powers. David Wills 
(2014: 186) connects Derrida’s account of God’s vision to the god 
trick of drones. 
 
3. Adams and Barrie (2013: 247) use Kafka to discuss the moral 
unresponsiveness of bureaucratic military violence in the context of 
drones. However, they do not discuss the ‘mystical’ appearance of 
this bureaucratic violence. 
 
4. Rolf Hellebust (2003) has offered a fascinating account of these 
alchemical dreams of the transformation of flesh to metal in the 
Soviet avant-garde. With the drone we could add another history, 
indebted to capitalist militarism. 
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